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Abstract
This research attempts to measure the impact of monopsony power on baseball
players with less than six years of experience. Past research indicates that players with
less than six years of experience have lower salaries than players with the same
productivity and more than six years of experience. To try and combat monopsonistic
behavior, baseball player's formed the Players' Union and instituted an arbitration
process. Through this process, a third party arbitrator listens to cases from both a player
and owner and then chooses either the player's or the owner's salary bid. While this
process is intended to help players gain market power, it is still unclear whether the actual
process is effective. Therefore, it is important to evaluate trends in players' salaries
before, during, and after arbitration in order to see if further changes in the arbitration
process need to be made.
\
To do this, 19 outfielders who have filed for and received an arbitration hearing
during the time frame of 1990-2003 are examined following their career throughout their
pre-arbitration (first three years), arbitration year (after third year), and post-arbitration
years (after fourth year on). By using the human capital model, three ratios of the
players' actual salaries during these years to a predicted free agent salary are estimated.
The prediction that the ratios should increase throughout these three periods, due to the
fact that the players gain more market power, is supported by the results. In fact, the
ratios of actual to predicted salary increase from 0.27 in pre-arbitration years, to 0.97 in
the arbitration year, to over 1.2 in post-arbitration years. This indicates that the players
face substantial monopsony power in the pre-arbitration year followed by a decrease in
monopsony power through the arbitration process and post-arbitration years.
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Introduction

The arbitration process in baseball has had its share of controversy over the past twenty
years. In fact, one of the main causes for the Players' Strike in 1994 was the player and owner
disagreement surrounding the stipulations of arbitration (Faurot, 1992). While this process is in
place to try to gain power back for players, a question of its effectiveness remains.
When baseball players sign multimillion dollar contracts, the general public tends to
question whether a single person is worth millions of dollars to simply playa game. Fortunately
for baseball, statistics showing player's productivity are easy to measure and readily available.
Therefore, economic analysis ofthe baseball market is possible.
Baseball players do not just randomly receive high salaries. Owners receive revenue
based on player's performances, and owners pay players based on these revenues. In economic
terms, owners try to measure a player's marginal revenue product of each player before assessing
a salary.
\

In the baseball market, arbitration-eligibles and free agents try to attain salaries which
reflect their MRP ofthe previous year. While free agents are free to sign with any team in the
league, arbitration-eligibles must negotiate with their respective team. Therefore, all players in
baseball are not in a truly competitive market (Marburger, 2004).
In this paper, I hypothesize that the ratio of a players' actual salary to that of a predicted
free agent salary increases over time finally approaching one. Furthermore, I believe that during
a player's pre-arbitration years (prior to arbitration and free agency), a player will face substantial
monopsonistic power and that the pre-arbitration player's salary will be substantially lower than
the salary predicted by the free agent regression model. If the arbitration process is effective in
combating owners' monopsony power, actual wages should be close to parity with predicted
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wages. Furthermore, after arbitration, the player's salary should be equal to predicted salary
since he is now participating in the competitive free agent market. Through this research I hope
to measure the impact of monopsony power on baseball players' salaries prior to arbitration and
during arbitration to gain a better understanding of the baseball market.

Arbitration Process

Before jumping into the literature and models of baseball, it is imperative to discuss the
basic characteristics of Major League Baseball. Before baseball arbitration began in 1974,
players were drafted onto a team and were not able to test their "market value" by negotiating
contracts with other teams. Typically, one owner held the rights to a player and thus had
monopsonistic power over him. Consequently, owners often paid players well below their
marginal revenue products (Frederick, 1992).
In response, players formed the MLB arbitration process in 1974 to try to gain market
power back. Final-offer arbitration (FOA)~ as it is formally known, is set up to give players a
chance to increase their salaries before they are able to file for free agency. During this process,
both the player and his respective team submit their final offers between January 5 and January
15 of each year. The hearings for the cases are then scheduled during the time period of
February I and February 20. Before the hearings, players and owners are encouraged to
continue negotiations. In fact, most players who file for arbitration do not make it to the actual
arbitration hearing (Faurot, 1992).
If the player and owner cannot reach an agreement, a third party arbitrator will be
selected to the hearing. At this hearing, the player and owner are given one hour to present
evidence and one-half hour to rebut the other side's case. Following the hearing, the arbitrator
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has 24 hours to choose one offer, which will become the player's salary for the following season
(Faurot, 1992). The criteria which arbitrators use to decide their judgments are:
(1) The player's contribution during the past season, including overall performance and
special qualities of leadership and public appeal;
(2) Length and consistency of career contribution;
(3) The player's past compensation;
(4) Comparative baseball salaries;
(5) Recent club performance; and
(6) Any physical or mental defects in the player.
Arbitrators, however, are not permitted to decide their cases based upon:
(1) Financial position of player and club;

(2) Press comments, testimonials, or similar material regarding player or club
performance;
(3) Offers made by either the player or the club prior to arbitration;
\

(4) Expenditures of the player or club on agents, representatives, and so on; and
(5) Salaries of other sports or occupations.
Also, arbitrators are not permitted to explain their choice of awards. They simply write the
award into the Uniform Player's Contract. This indicates that the actual preferred award of the
arbitrator is never revealed and must be inferred indirectly (Burgess, 2004).
It is important to note that the selection of arbitrators is an important factor in arbitration

behavior. Arbitrators are selected by both the players' union and the Player Relations
Committee (representing the baseball clubs). Since their "models" for determining a winner is
kept secret, arbitrators must neither favor players nor clubs. If arbitrators were to favor players
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over clubs, for example, the Player Relations Committee would not select them the following
year (Faurot, 1992).
In fact, since the institution of this process, Dworkin (1981) indicates that the final results
have been even. Of the cases which have been filed, the results are split between the players and
the owners. This "indecision" regarding the decision of an arbitrator helps to push players and
owners toward a negotiation rather than face a hearing (Faurot, 1992). It also suggests that the
two extreme awards shown in the monopsony power model developed below are likely not to be
realized since both parties realize that an arbitrator is unlikely to accept either an offer extremely
favorable to owners or an offer extremely favorable to players.

Review of Literature

To be able to measure the impact of the arbitration process on player's salaries, it is first
important to develop a model to measure player productivity. In The Value of Sports Talent,
Rodney Fort (2003) concludes that a gener~l Marginal Revenue Product (MRP) model is ideal
(Fort,2003). Under this theory, a player's salary can be determined based on productivity
measures of a player (Fort, 2003).
In baseball, different statistics are readily available to measure player productivity.
Andrew Zimbalist (1992) argues that productivity (PROD), also known as OPS (on-base
percentage plus slugging percentage), which adds a player's on-base percentage ((hits + walks +
hit by pitches)/ (at bats + walks + sacrifices + hit by pitches)) and slugging percentage (total
bases/at bats), is the best measure of a hitter's productivity. At the time, Slugging Percentage
was generally used to measure player productivity. However, Zimbalist believes that while
Slugging Percentage "is a good indicator of offensive performance, it excludes one major
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component of offensive contribution, walks" (Zimbalist, 1992). Therefore, OPS should be used
because it not only takes into account power statistics, but also walks.
Alan Schwarz (2004) agrees with Zimbalist that OPS is the best statistic to measure a
hitter's productivity. As Schwarz explains, this statistic "measures the key areas of offensive
production: getting on base and advancing runners" (Schwarz, 2004). As he further explains in
his article, looking at just SLG without OBP "is like subsisting on food without water" (Schwarz,
2004) because both are necessary.
Phillip Miller (2000) conducts both a theoretical and empirical comparison of negotiated
salaries detennined in baseball's free agent system to those detennined in its final-offer
arbitration system. In this model, Miller attempts to predict the salary of a player based on
specific productivity measures. Some of these productivity measures range from a Runs Created
(RC) variable, which is detennined by (Hits + Walks) *(Total Bases)/(Plate Appearances), to runs
a player saves defensively. In his results, Miller concludes that an offensive productivity
measure, RC, is significant, while the defensive
productivity measures are not (Miller, 2000).
\
Miller also concludes that there is a difference in the salary structure for arbitration
eligibles and free agent players (Miller, 2000). While he finds out that there is a significant
positive relationship between the salaries of free agents directly affecting the negotiated salaries
of arbitration eligibles, Miller concludes that the systems do not detennine equal salaries for
players with the same MRP (Miller, 2000).
Marburger (1996) uses MRP models to test salary with respect to years of experience. In
his study, he concludes that experience is in fact significant when detennining a player's salary
(Marburger, 1996). Furthennore, he concludes that players with more than six years of
experience, thus able to freely sign with any team, are subject to salaries closest to their marginal
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revenue products. This supports the notion that the arbitration process does not fully eliminate
monopsonistic behavior.

Theoretical Framework

This study makes use of the human capital theory, which states that players should be
compensated based on certain productivity measures. Since productivity is possible to measure
in baseball, this theory is applicable for this research. Salary is therefore determined by certain
productivity measures.
This research also makes use of a modified version of the monopsony model. This model
is shown below:

Figure 1:
Monopsony Model
wage,

MFC

MRP
quantity of labor

In this market, there are several sellers of service (pre-free-agency players), but there is

only one buyer (an owner). Therefore the firm faces a monopsonistic market for labor, but it is a
unique monopsonistic market. Since workers differ in both abilities and in terms of opportunity
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costs, each player will have a unique MRP and a unique reservation wage. Since each player has
unique characteristics and since some players can negotiate their individual wages with the firm,
the traditional monopsonistic view of the marginal cost of labor curve no longer holds. Instead,
we can only identify a range within which the wage settlement will occur for each player
Suppose that the team ranks players from most productive to least productive. The
potential marginal revenue product is given by MRP in figure 1. If the roster is Lo number of
players, Figure 1 shows that player Lo has a reservation wage ofwo and a MRP ofw*.
Therefore, if player Lo goes to arbitration, the two wages submitted to the arbitrator would be
bounded by the two constraints ofthe monopsony model: w* and woo In the pre-arbitration
years, a player's wage would be wo because he does not have market power, and the owner
would pay only enough to ensure that the player does not exit the market. Through the
arbitration process, the wage moves closer to w*, but does not reach it. If arbitrators have evenly
dispersed the number of winners between owners and players and do not generally accept
"extreme" proposals, the "average" wage w~uld fall between these two constraints. Therefore,
arbitration eligibles still face monopsonistic power because their actual wage is less than their
MRP. However, the players do face less monopsonistic power in their arbitration year than pre
arbitration years.

Data

This model uses strictly outfielders because these individuals generally have the highest
offensive production numbers. Consequently, their salaries generally reflect offensive
production. The sample consists of 19 outfielders who applied for and received a hearing in the
arbitration process. By following their salary and production changes throughout their respective
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careers, each "phase" of their career can be represented. Table 1 lists the variables and
descriptive statistics for these players:

Table 1: Variables and Descriptions (Free Agents)
Predicted
Sign

Name

Definition

Mean

Max

Min

Std. Dev.

Salary

Value of Contract

$5,691,372

$26,700,038

$284,893

$6,396,355

+

GP

Games Played

Games Played
before contract
was awarded

115

163

2

43

+

OPS (PROD)

OPS (PROD)

753

1800

0

154

Statistic
Dependent
Variable
SAL

Independent
Variable

Slugging % +
On-base %

Source: Baseballreference.com

For each player, offensive statistics as well as games played from the year prior to
signing a new contract or filing for arbitration are used. For example, if a player signed a new
contract in 1992, the offensive statistics from 1991 are used. These statistics are used because
owners will use previous offensive productivity measures to determine the value of each player.
Also, the salaries are computed into 2003 dollar figures using a baseball wage index. This index
is computed using the average salaries for baseball players in each year using 2004 as the base
year. Therefore, all dollar values should be interpreted in 2004 baseball dollar figures.
These statistics can be found on www.baseballreference.com or www.espn.com. To find
data for players who have filed for either arbitration or free agency, www.roadsideohotos.comis
an excellent site and was used for this study. This website offers a complete list of players filing
for free agency and arbitration as well as the year in which this was done.
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Empirical Framework
This study researches and measures the impact of monopsony power on baseball players
over the course of their career. To do this, three ratios are constructed measuring actual salary to
a predicted free agent salary. By doing so, the ratio explains how close the player's actual salary,
most notably in pre-arbitration and arbitration years, is to an estimated salary the player would
have received via free agency.
The first step in this research is to develop a model which can predict free agent salary
based on productivity measures. Based on my previous research which used 228 outfielders who
were granted free agency and signed a new contract between 1990 and 2003, a model to predict
salary has been developed. Equation 1 shows this model:

This regression assumes that salary is determined through basic human capital theory. To
determine the productivity measures OPS and GP, different offensive and defensive productivity
measures are included in the model. However, only OPS and GP are statistically significant.
\

Furthermore, defensive statistics are removed from the model because of their ambiguity. As
Miller indicates, the faster players could be penalized because they run to a ball and drop it,
whereas a slower player would not get to the ball and would let it bounce and not be charged an
error (Miller, 2000).
However, improvements to the above model are necessary because the focus of this paper
is not geared to find the best productivity measures themselves, but instead to obtain the best
prediction of what players would make in a free agency market. One such improvement deals
with the constant of the equation. Intuitively, it makes sense that a player should not make
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money ifhe is not productive. Also, it is intuitive that negative salaries should not be a likely
prediction. Therefore, the constant term is constrained to the origin.
Another improvement deals with the actual data itself. Since baseball has been growing
more rapidly in terms of inflation over the past 15 years, an inflationary baseball index using
average baseball salaries for each year will give a more accurate depiction of the baseball
salaries than the CPI index. Therefore, all salaries are in 2004 baseball dollar figures.
With these improvements, the equation for the predicted free agent salary is expressed in
Equation 2:
SAL =

0\

OPS + 02 GP + E (2)

Note that while the constant is removed, the equation still uses the same productivity measures as
the previous research.

Results
The results from the two regression ~quations are found in Table 2. Equation 1 includes
the constant term and Equation 2 suppresses the constant to zero:

Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent Variable
Statistic
SAL
Independent Variables
Statistic
Constant
Games Played
OPS
R Square
Sample Size

Source: The Author

Equation 1

Equation 2

Coefficients Coefficients
-18,746,990
0
52,996
75,728
-386
19,896
0.254
0.403
228
228
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By removing the constant from the equation, the R Squared value decreases from .403 to .254.
While the R-squared value for the model does decrease, the overall predictions are improved.
There are zero negative salary predictions indicating that the lower bound of the salary
predictions is improved. (Note that to make the R Squared value for Equation 2 comparable to
the R Squared value for Equation 1, a Pearson correlation test between the unstandardized
predicted values for salary and the actual salary was calculated and squared.)
To obtain the results for the ratios, a ratio representing a player's actual salary divided by
the salary that was estimated using a sample of228 outfielders is constructed. For example, the
pre-arbitration ratio represents the player's actual salary divided by the predicted free agent
salary estimate. These estimates are reported in Table 2. The estimated salary for each of the 19
players who went through arbitration is determined for each year by using the regression
obtained in Equation 2. Then the average of all 19 players' pre-arbitration years is determined to
obtain the pre-arbitration ratio. The same format is used for the arbitration ratio and post
\

arbitration ratio. The players' actual salary divided by the salary that was estimated in Equation
2 is conducted for the given timeframe. The results for the pre-arbitration, arbitration, and postarbitration ratios are listed in Table 3.

Table 3: Ratios Results
All Arbitration Players

Arbitration Players (minus outliers)

0.2711
0.9660
1.2857

0.2603
0.9004
0.9627

Pre-Arbitration
Arbitration
Post-Arbitration

Source: The Author
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The first set ofratios (all arbitration players) indicates that prior to arbitration, players face
significant monopsonistic exploitation. In fact, the arbitration players who received a hearing
since 1990 received only 27% of what they could have made via free agency. During the
arbitration year, a player is able to gain significant power back, but not completely. This is to be
expected, as they are able to negotiate a new contract, but only with their own ball club. It is
important, however, to note that the arbitration ratios are not statistically significant from one,
yet they are statistically different from the post-arbitration ratio.
While the first two ratios seem to line up with theory, the post-arbitration ratio of 1.29 is
unexpected. This indicates that these players' actual salary is 1.29 times a predicted free agent
salary. To try to explain this phenomenon, the second set of ratios is offered. These ratios
follow the same format, actual salary to predicted free agent salary, but leave out players who
have post-arbitration ratios above 2.5. These players, which include Bernie Williams, Barry
Bonds, and Bobby Bonilla, receive salaries well above a predicted free agent salary. This may
be due to the fact that these players have sQme sort of "star power" which may lead to higher
salaries. These higher salaries may be justified because "stars" attract more fans and more fans
mean higher MRP. Thus, a variable that may be omitted from the estimation is some sort of
proxy for star power. This might be a fruitful area for future research.
When leaving these players out of the arbitration player ratios, the results improve. As
shown in Table 3, the ratios increase from 0.26 to 0.90 to 0.96. As hypothesized, the ratios for
these three periods increase over time and approach one.
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Conclusion
The results of the ratios indicate that players face substantial monopsonistic power early
in their career, and only gain market power back through the arbitration process and free agency.
This research takes Marburger (1996) and Miller's (2000) works one step further as it digs
deeper into the pre-arbitration years of players. By providing meaningful ratios, the actual
monopsonistic power of owners is shown. As Table 3 indicates, players in the pre-arbitration
stage of their career receive only 27% of the salary they could receive via free agency. The
arbitration process, however, allows players to gain some market power back, but also allows the
owners to retain some monopsonistic power. As Faurot points out, this is expected because the
terms for the arbitration process are negotiated by both the players' union and the Player
Relations Committee.
In this research the concept that some players are paid well above their productivity
contributions to their respective team is developed. It appears that some sort of "star power" is
assigned to these players, which enables them to receive salaries based on characteristics other
\

than the measures of productivity used in this study. Future research could look into the star
power issue to find a way to measure this effect. Regression analysis may be able to find certain
characteristics such as home runs per year, MVP awards, endorsement deals, rookie card value,
an experience factor, etc. If a certain star power measure is found, the addition of that unit to this
research's equation would be beneficial.
Future research could also explore the effects of the arbitration process on a player's
salary at all positions. Developing a free agent model for pitchers, for example, may help to
show whether these players face the same type of monopsonistic behavior as outfielders. If a

Tarman 14
model were constructed for all position players, it may help players decided which positions are
the most beneficial early in their careers.

\
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